Baseball takes on different forms for different people, but for me, baseball isn’t the best player, or any nostalgia-tinged memory. Baseball is the player whose game embodied the sport more than anyone I can recall watching.

Baseball is Yordano Ventura.

Yordano Ventura was baseball. Everything about him personified the best – and at times, worst – of this game we love so dearly. From his childhood, to being discovered at a tryout and signing for a five-figure bonus, to developing into a top prospect and delivering a memorable performance under a national spotlight and doing it all with fire and joy and intensity and exuberance that made every moment so compelling.

He was immensely talented, with a right arm possessing one of the most valuable commodities in the sport – velocity. And that velocity seemed to materialize with relative ease, made even more surprising considering Ventura’s slight frame. The first time I saw Ventura pitch in person was at his AAA debut in Omaha. He was warming up prior to the first inning, and after what appeared to be a calm, typical warm-up toss, I peered over at a scout’s radar gun and saw the number “95” blink, which caused me to blink as well. He coined the hashtag “#LetsThrowFire,” and at times he even seemed to do so quite literally.

The smoothness of his delivery was counteracted by the sudden violence of his recoil, his right arm rifling back toward his body with such a whip, it was amazing to not see Ventura writhe in pain after every pitch.

Watching Ventura pitch was to watch baseball in all its basebally goodness. He was one of the most talented pitchers in the game, with a fastball few could match, and yet, he was unable to dominate hitters on a consistent basis. He’d struggle with control. He’d hang a breaking ball. He’d catch too much of the middle of the plate. Despite his breathtaking talent, Ventura battled the same issues nearly every major-league pitcher battles. He was one in a million while at the same time being just one of a million. He was baseball.

The joy with which Ventura pitched on his best days was a reminder of how fun this game should be. One of the most iconic plays of his career involved a harmless ground ball back to Ventura, because his normal leg kick on his follow through apparently just didn’t have enough swagger. He was, at heart, a kid playing the game he loved, and when things were going well for him, his smile on the mound could be seen from the 400-level of Kauffman Stadium. He had so much passion for the game, such an intense drive to win. He played with fire. Kids from around Kansas City will be wearing the number 30 because of that joy, and that fire, and that smile. And despite the advice of their coaches, there will be a few leg kicks, too.

But when things weren’t going well, Ventura could become his own worst enemy. He would do everything he could to prove himself, often at the expense of his results. He played with fire. Whether it was throwing intentionally at a batter or shouting at an opponent, Ventura would let his emotions get the best of him, because he hated losing and hated being shown up even more. As a fan, it was frustrating to watch him succumb to the worst parts of this game, the immaturity and borderline dangerous behavior. He had the natural ability to get back at his opponent with his pitching, but too frequently did so with his pitches, allowing pride to get in the way of performance. He was not alone in this behavior. He was baseball.

Every start Ventura made was must-watch television. It’s been said that “you can’t predict baseball,” and Ventura’s starts brought that phrase to life at 100 mph. While it was common to expect good things from him, you were never quite sure how the day would go. He could strike out a dozen hitters, give up a pair of dingers in the first two innings, or possibly get into a shouting match with someone on the field. It wasn’t always good, but it was always captivating. Seeing Ventura’s flame-emblazoned right forearm propel toward the plate caused you to hold your breath. It was like watching Ken Griffey, Jr start his swing, or Carlos Beltran take that first step toward a fly ball in center. You weren’t sure what was about to happen, but you were sure you needed to watch, because something was about to happen. And if something didn’t happen on that pitch, that just meant it would happen on the next one. That anticipation made tuning in to his games a necessity.

For those fortunate enough to watch Ventura pitch in person, the experience was similarly awe-inspiring. From the simple rock of his windup, to the explosion toward home, the pop of the catcher’s mitt, and the gust of wind as 30,000 fans simultaneously turned their heads to the scoreboard to see digital flames reveal what everyone already suspected. 99 mph. 100 mph. 101 mph. It didn’t take long for the ball to travel 60 feet, 6 inches, but it was enough time for the suspense to build, and for an entire stadium of spectators to widen their eyes while the hairs on the back of their collective necks stand on end. When Ventura was on the mound, each pitch felt like it could change the course of the game. Anything was possible when the ball was in his hand. He was baseball.

He showed so many flashes of brilliance intermixed with periods of disappointment. Ventura was not the first player to belie his ability with inconsistent performance, nor will he be the last. Baseball is a difficult game played by people who make it seem simple. It’s a game based on failure, and even though we can recognize that and internalize it as fact, it’s still so disheartening to see a player fail, particularly one as talented as Ventura. Failure is, of course, a relative term here. Simply reaching the big leagues at all must be considered a magnificent success, especially considering Ventura’s backstory. But there was always a feeling around him, and within him, that there was more success to find. That a better start was just four days away.

We were drawn to Ventura because the only inevitability with his starts was that fire would be thrown. That fire could erupt into an inferno in an instant, so we watched. We admired the wonder of his talent, and wondered when that talent would reach its zenith. We shook our heads in discouragement, and in disbelief.

We appreciated his game and his story, because his story made us feel like a part of the game.

Ventura’s story is one of what could have been and what was. It’s a story of what is, and what will be. It’s a story of baseball.

In the last few months, it seemed like the Royals – as well as other teams – have been swinging at 3-0 pitches more frequently. As it turns out, my eyeballs did not deceive me. The MLB average for swing rate on 3-0 pitches this season is 9.5 percent, up from 8.7 percent last year, and 7.9 percent in 2015. Over the course of the season, that difference amounts to a few extra 3-0 swings per team, if it’s divided equally. In reality, it’s not divided equally. Before showing you this year’s top numbers, let’s look at the leaderboard from 2016.

As expected, Kansas City was among the leaders last year. Now, check out the top five teams in 3-0 swing rate this season.

The Royals are not only number one, they’re lapping the field. In the last five seasons, no team had even surpassed a 3-0 swing rate of 16.5 percent until this year, and while the Dodgers are certainly doing their part, they still have a long way to go to catch up to Kansas City. (For those curious, the Royals have been in the top three in three of the last five seasons, but were below average in this metric in 2013 and 2015.)

To give you an idea of just how absurd this 3-0 swing rate is, here is a chart of the Royals’ 3-0 swing rate compared to the MLB average 3-0 swing rate over the last ten seasons.

I suppose if you’re going to be aggressive, BE AGGRESSIVE. The Royals are not to be bothered with taking pitches. Why wait for another pitch when there’s a perfectly fine baseball coming near the plate now? Carpe baseball, and what have you.

Now, I do think there’s something to be said for going after a hittable pitch, and with the Royals having some power in the lineup at the expense of contact, it makes some sense to take a big hack on a pitch in the nitro zone. The problem is that the Royals haven’t done nearly enough damage on those hacks.

As a team, they’re hitting .400 with a .733 slugging percentage on balls they put in play on 3-0. Those are really good numbers in most situations! But in this situation, those numbers are much less good. They’re tied for 19th in average, and 18th in slugging percentage among all 30 teams.

This isn’t to say 3-0 pitches should be auto-takes. The Dodgers are easily the best team in baseball, and they’ve taken more 3-0 swings than anyone. They’ve simply done more with those swings than the Royals have, with a .435 average and 1.043 slugging percentage. And because they have gotten into far more 3-0 counts total, they’ve had more opportunities to draw the walk or do some work.

Among the Royals, Eric Hosmer is the most aggressive in 3-0 counts. He’s taken ten swings at pitches in that situation. Here are those pitches:

For the most part, those are some meaty, meaty pitches. Here are the results of those swings:

Five fouls, four outs, and one measly single. I should point out that the five balls put in play averaged 98.5 mph off the bat, so he is making solid contact. That’s still five foul balls, and fair or not, 3-0 swings are judged on the result. Aggressiveness is good until it isn’t, and thus far it hasn’t worked out for Hosmer or the rest of the Royals.

Mike Moustakas has taken eight hacks on 3-0 pitches, fouling off four, making outs on two, whiffing on one, and collecting one hit. Lorenzo Cain and Salvador Perez have had a bit more success, totaling four hits among their 12 swings. No other Royals have hits on 3-0. That’s six hits on 39 swings at some of the more hittable pitches a big league hitter is going to see.

Those are missed opportunities in a season full of missed opportunities. The American League is full of flawed, mediocre teams, and while the Royals are still in good position to make a run to the playoffs, they’ve had chances to separate themselves from the pack and haven’t done so. They’ve had chances to gain ground on yet another underachieving Cleveland squad, but haven’t done so. Not taking advantage of a 3-0 cookie can be just as frustrating as the Royals current position.

Despite all of that, these Royals are still the Royals. They’re going to keep taking some healthy cuts at 3-0 pitches, and they’ll probably pick up a few more doubles and dingers. Those extra-base hits won’t make up for the missed chances earlier in the season, but they likely will give the Royals more chances to keep the rest of the season going for just a bit longer.

While Trevor Cahill is likely the biggest chip coming to Kansas City, there was another name I found even more intriguing. Brandon Maurer has long had electric stuff. His fastball sat in the mid-90s even when he was a starting pitcher, and he can now top 100 with it out of the bullpen. Along with that, his slider and changeup can miss quite a few bats sitting in the mid 80s.

However, like so many pitchers before him, Maurer hasn’t really had the results to match the stuff. Since coming over to San Diego before the 2015 season, Maurer has a 4.33 ERA, despite maintaining very good strikeout, walk, and hits allowed numbers. His WHIP of 1.181 in that time definitely appears to be too low to go along with the higher ERA, but with 160 innings of work, this can’t really be ignored. Ultimately, it comes down to his performance with men on base.

In his career, Maurer has allowed a .222/.267/.348 line with the bases empty. When batters reach, he’s allowed a .325/.387/.512 line. So what is it that is causing Maurer’s downright Hochevarian issues with men on base?

First, let’s look at those numbers against batters from each side of the plate over the last three seasons.

In the interest of full disclosure, the number of at-bats for each split ranged from 110 (vs. LHB with men on base) up to 188 (vs. LHB with bases empty).

While the numbers against lefties with men on base aren’t exactly dominant, they clearly aren’t the main cause of Maurer’s struggles when opponents reach base.

I certainly don’t want to pretend that I have any kind of real expertise when it comes to major-league pitching, but on the surface level, it seems that Maurer’s problems are somewhat straightforward. Just take a look at this heatmap of pitches to righties with the bases empty:

And now compare that to the location of pitches thrown to righties with men on base:

That cluster of pitches in the middle of the zone? Yeah, those are bad. Maurer has simply left too many pitches in the heart of the plate for batters to feast on, a problem that is amplified with men on the basepaths.

Perhaps connected to the poor location is the pitch selection. Since 2015, with the bases empty, Maurer throws his fastball roughly 57 percent of the time and his slider about 37 percent of the time. With men on base, that ratio goes to 46 percent fastball and 46 percent slider. If Maurer were locating his slider on the outside corner more often, this likely wouldn’t be as much of a problem, but it appears that he’s not commanding this pitch as well, leaving a few over the plate, which makes it all the more interesting that he’s still throwing so many sliders in those situations. This lack of command has also resulted in a walk rate of 10.4 percent with men on base, well above his 4.4 percent rate with the bases empty.

One other potential factor is Maurer’s delivery. Unlike many relievers, he still employs the full windup with the bases empty, only using the stretch once men reach. It’s possible that his delivery from the stretch simply needs a mechanical tweak so everything is on time. After a brief video review nothing stood out to me, but there’s a reason I’m typing these words and not wearing Dave Eiland’s uniform in the Royals clubhouse. If there is a mechanical flaw, I’m confident Eiland can find it and fix it.

Maurer won’t be a free agent until 2020, which means the addition of his powerful right arm to the Royals bullpen could be quite valuable. If the Royals aren’t contenders in the next couple of seasons, an effective Maurer becomes a terrific trade chip. For the time being, though, the Royals are contenders. They’re in a great position to roar into the playoffs, and if Maurer can turn things around, he can become a vital cog in what could be another dominant Royals bullpen.

There, now that that’s out of the way, let’s talk about something more fun, like the Kansas City Royals starting rotation. It’s been extremely undreadful. They lead all of baseball in ERA, and the last time a Royals starter allowed more than one run was nine days ago. The rotation has been excellent, and outside of that first series, the bullpen has held their own as well. The biggest key to the pitching success has been their changeups.

Through Wednesday’s games, the Royals have been absolutely dominant with changeups. And “absolutely dominant” might be underselling it. According to data from Statcast, opposing batters are 15-100 against that pitch, with all 15 hits being singles. In case you don’t have a calculator near by, that’s a .150 batting average and a .150 slugging percentage. It’s also an isolated slugging percentage that is equal to my own isolated slugging percentage. And yours. And your infant’s.

Jason Vargas, Danny Duffy, and Ian Kennedy have combined to allow six hits in 60 at-bats that end on a changeup. Vargas’ .107 average allowed is the highest in that trio. Add in Nathan Karns and his .154 average allowed on the pitch, and you can see how the rotation has rolled to that league-best ERA thus far. Because when a pitch is as effective as the changeup has been for Kansas City, it makes sense to throw quite a few of them.

Royals pitchers have thrown 380 changeups through Wednesday’s action this season, which is a rate of roughly 18.6 percent. The next-highest rate belongs to the Indians, at 13.9 percent. Put another way, the difference between the Royals changeup rate and the second-highest changeup rate is as large as the difference between the second-highest changeup rate and the 19th-highest changeup rate (Astros, 9.2 percent).

Vargas has always leaned on his elite changeup, and he’s continuing to throw it roughly 30 percent of the time. Our own David Lesky recently wrote about Duffy’s changeup, and as he’s carried over last season’s success with it, he’s increased its usage from 17 percent in 2016 to more than 27 percent in 2017. Both of those pitchers rank in the top ten changeup rates among those with at least 150 total pitches thrown, and Karns checks in at 14, with a rate of nearly 25 percent. Kennedy has only thrown 44 changeups out of his 305 pitches, but he’s also induced 16 whiffs with it. And that brings us to another aspect of this staff’s changeup dominance: whiffs by the bushel.

As a team, the Royals have gotten 86 whiffs with changeups. Once again, that’s the most in baseball. Once again, the second-highest total belongs to the Indians, and once again, that total is not in the Royals’ stratosphere. They’re at 54, which is an excellent whiff rate of 17.1 percent. The Royals’ whiff rate is sitting at 22.6 percent. For perspective, Stephen Strasburg had a changeup whiff rate of 22 percent last season. They’re not quite in Cole Hamels territory, but it’s been an unbelievably effective pitch for several Royals, which has led to their remarkable start.

“On pace for” stats are always stupid this early in the season, but I’m going to present you with one anyway:

The Royals are on pace to induce approximately 1,000 whiffs with changeups.

See! Look at how stupid that stat is! It’s absurd!

Last year the Royals were one of the best at getting swings and misses with changeups, and they “only” induced 550 of them. That was the second-highest total in baseball, trailing the Angels, who were at 778. The Angels’ whiff rate on the changeup was about 15.5 percent. The Royals’ whiff rate was 17.3 percent. This year’s squad is obliterating those numbers.

Having said that, it certainly seems like we should expect some regression. There are quite a few top-notch changeups amongst Royals pitchers, and even if they don’t maintain this pace, they’re still going to miss plenty of bats. They might even allow an extra-base hit or two, at some point. That won’t change what’s been done to this point, however. Led by Vargas, Duffy, and Kennedy, the Royals have been masterful on the mound, and they have their changeups to thank.

While the Indians had an excellent offense last year, they did see relatively worse performances when facing left-handed pitchers. As a team last season, Cleveland had a .763 OPS against righties and a .748 OPS against lefties. A 15-point difference isn’t huge, but there is a difference.

Since that’s just a one-year sample, and since the lineup may look different this year, I wanted to get a bit more data on their potential platoon problem. The following is a table containing most or all of the position players for the 2017 Indians, along with their numbers against both left- and right-handed pitching since the start of the 2014 season. The last column shows how much worse or better each hitter is against lefties.

That’s a lot of numbers! The most important column is that last one, though, so you can focus on that for now. As you can see, the Indians have a handful of players with significantly worse numbers when facing lefties. That’s not to say they’re “bad” against lefties, but any slight advantage you can take away from Brantley, Naquin, Encarnacion, and Santana is an advantage worth taking. (As a side note, Brantley is going to miss some time again this season, and I’d put a large sum of money on Naquin’s numbers against lefties regressing this season, but the numbers are the numbers for now.)

Left-handed batters Kipnis and Chisenhall obviously have their issues with southpaws, but Kipnis isn’t going to be subbed out against them as Chisenhall will be. That brings us to a slight complication: Terry Francona.

Tito loves making moves, and he’s quite fond of platooning players to put them in the best possible position to succeed. In other words, Naquin and Chisenhall may get starts against righties, but if a lefty comes out of the bullpen, Guyer or Jackson would probably step out of the dugout. And if a lefty has to face Guyer, he might as well just get the plate appearance over with and plunk him in the backside, because the only possible outcomes are a hit by pitch or an extra-base hit. That’s just what Guyer does.

On the other side of that scenario, if a lefty starts, Guyer and Jackson would probably be in the lineup, with the other two set to come off the bench when an opposing manager goes with a righty from the bullpen. Tito wants to maximize his offense’s chances of success, particularly in high-leverage situations. The best way to combat such a strategy is to have quality left-handed pitchers up and down the roster. As it turns out, the Royals may possess that quality.

Danny Duffy and Jason Vargas are locks for the rotation, and while Nathan Karns could sew up the fifth spot, Travis Wood also has a good chance to be in that role, which would give the Royals three lefties in the rotation. When those three start against Cleveland, they automatically gain a slight advantage. Wood has had some problems with right-handed bats in his career, so there could be concern there. But he also is surrounded by one guy who’s always had a terrific changeup (Vargas) and another whose breakout season can partially be attributed to a new grip on his changeup (Duffy). Oh, and his pitching coach is a certified wizard. Improvement isn’t guaranteed, but it’s certainly not impossible.

In addition to those arms, the Royals should have Matt Strahm in some type of setup role, which will be extremely important in this season series. Let’s explore a hypothetical scenario:

Vargas gets the start in Cleveland, and gives up a couple of runs in five laborious innings of work, as his own offense provides four runs of support. With Guyer, Perez, and Jackson due up, Ned Yost decides to bring in a right-handed reliever for the sixth. In comes Joakim Soria. After the fine folks of Twitter fire off a series of angry tweets, Soria takes the mound as pinch hitter Lonnie Chisenhall steps in to the box. Chisenhall predictably doubles, and after Perez grounds out, Naquin pinch hits for Jackson. A single gives the Indians another run, and even though Soria induces an inning-ending double play, the damage has been done.

Fast forward to the eighth inning, and the Royals are clinging to a one-run lead. Chisenhall, Perez, and Naquin are set to bat, and with no more righty bats on Tito’s bench, Yost can bring in Strahm without worrying about losing the advantage. Strahm retires the side in order, as does Kelvin Herrera in the ninth, and the Royals walk away from Progressive Field with a much-needed intra-division victory.

Now, that is a pretty specific set of circumstances, but it’s not an outlandish possibility. The reverse could also work: right-handed starter and reliever sandwiching a lefty reliever, forcing Guyer and Jackson to face a tough righty in the later innings. And to reiterate, simply by starting a left-handed pitcher, the Indians’ expected offensive production will decline.

Ideally, the Royals would have multiple lefties in the bullpen, which is why I’d prefer having Karns start and Wood relieve, but they can make it work either way. While they may not make a huge impact, or even appear in the big leagues, Scott Alexander, Mike Minor, and Eric Skoglund also throw baseballs with their left hands, and could conceivably be used to help attack Cleveland’s relative weak spot. There are options.

Things can change, and perhaps their offense performs better against lefties this season. Maybe their switch-hitters and Encarnacion do enough to overcome any poor numbers from their role players, as well as make up for the time Brantley is on the disabled list. But if this platoon problem can be exploited by someone, even ever-so-slightly, the Royals are well-positioned to be that someone. They’ll be rolling out left-handed starters two or three days out of five, and with at least one solid lefty in the bullpen, Yost will have enough weapons to try and tip the scales back in his favor.

Last season, the Royals actually had quite a bit of success against most of the Central Division. They went 14-5 against the White Sox, 12-7 against the Tigers, and a dominant 15-4 against the Twins. That’s a combined winning percentage of .719. That’s really good! Over a 162-game season, that winning percentage would result in 116.5 wins, which would not be a record, but it would be weird because portions of wins don’t actually happen. Still, it was impressive what the team did against those three rivals.

The problem, of course, is that there are four divisional opponents, and against the Indians, the Royals were a measly 5-14. Granted, the Indians were a very good team last year, and the Royals were, well, not. You would expect to see a losing record in that series, but the Royals were completely obliterated.

In the 19 games against Cleveland, the Royals allowed 92 runs, which is an average of 4.8 per game. That is obviously quite a few runs, but it’s not what hurt the Royals the most in those games. The offense scored 59 runs – just 3.1 per game. It was a full run per game lower than their already-low season average. They hit .239/.280/.360, with only 13 dingers. Only three regulars had an OPS above .700: Cheslor Cuthbert (.972), Salvador Perez (.867), and Jarrod Dyson (.742).

Part of the problem is that the Indians’ pitching staff is one of the more groundball-heavy staffs in the league. In fact, the Yankees were the only team in the AL last year with a higher groundball rate than the Indians, with both teams right around 47.8 percent. While none of their starters were extreme sinkerballers, all five of them had a groundball rate of at least 45 percent, with only Josh Tomlin hovering just below it. Add in a few relievers who specialize in getting worm-burners, and you can see how the numbers make sense.

The Royals struggled mightily against groundball pitchers, posting a .670 OPS in 966 plate appearances. The league average OPS against groundballers was .742, to give you some perspective. There were a few reasons the Royals stubbed their toes against the Indians last season, but the offensive woes sit at the top of the list.

Which brings us to Brandon Moss.

The Royals’ new designated hitter has made a name for himself in large part because of his production against groundball pitchers. In each of the last two seasons, his OPS has been roughly 20 percent higher against groundballers than his OPS against all pitchers.

The reason for this is Moss’ swing path. He does an excellent job getting loft on the ball by using a bit of an uppercut swing. While this can leave him vulnerable to high heat, it can often result in squaring up pitches with more of a downward trajectory, like those that will typically lead to grounders.

Moss has done some significant damage on pitches in the lower third, as you can see by this colorful image:

Clearly he has a hole in his swing up and in, but when he is able to get his arms extended, he can crush some baseballs. According to data from Statcast, Moss slugged .731 on at-bats that ended with a pitch in the lower third last season, which ranked 19th among 315 batters with at least 50 such at-bats. And that’s important, because as a team, the Royals slugged .487 in those at-bats last season, ranking 19th in baseball.

Now, it’s possible Moss finds himself in more of a platoon role, but fear not! The Indians rotation, as it looks in mid-February, will be entirely right handed. Granted, several of their pitchers will inevitably find themselves on the disabled list at some point, but even if Moss is platooned, he’d likely start every game against Cleveland.

Moss slugged .828 on pitches in the lower third from righties in 2016, and while that’s not a large sample, his swing suggests he should continue to crush right-handed pitching if they challenge him down in the zone. As it turns out, roughly 13 percent of the pitches thrown by Indians pitchers were thrown by righties AND ended up in the lower third of the zone. No AL team had a higher rate. Moss will have plenty of chances to reverse last year’s trend in those rivalry games.

It’s also worth noting that the man Moss is replacing, Kendrys Morales, hit a gentleman’s .164 against the Indians, with all of three extra-base hits in 69 plate appearances. Morales clearly wasn’t the only problem, but if he hit closer to his season line, particularly in some of the high leverage situations in those contests, perhaps the Royals steal another couple of games from the division winner. That wouldn’t have caused the two teams to swap places in the standings, but if the Royals have a couple extra wins earlier in the season, maybe they make a move at the deadline, or maybe they play with a bit more urgency before August. I’ll grant that this is getting into meaningless speculation, but Spring Training is here, so the time for meaningless speculation is dwindling.

The Royals probably haven’t caught up to the Indians this winter. The gap between the two teams last season was significant. However, it does look like the gap has narrowed, especially with the addition of Moss. The rest of the lineup will need to step up as well, but not many Royals have the ability to carry the offense against Cleveland quite like Moss can. His powerful swing will be a major key to staying in the playoff race within the division.

Over at BPKC headquarters, we’ve talked a bit about some impressive four- or five-year stretches in recent history, wondering how the Royals would measure up if they cap off this run with another pennant. To gain some perspective on what they’ve done so far, I looked back at the last 15 years of results for every team, and calculated their four-year rolling averages in the win column. As a simple way to include playoff success, I added in postseason wins as well.

This first graph contains all of the American League teams, sans-Houston, because they’re the weirdo who changed leagues. The second graph contains all of the National League teams, plus Houston, because they’re the weirdo who changed leagues.

To see the full comparison I could combine all 30 teams into a single graph, but I won’t, because I care about your eyeballs, and 30 different colored lines would almost certainly ruin their development. That’s a lot of words about some graphs, so here are the graphs (click to enlarge):

This graph has a very prominent trend. Years ago, the AL teams were in some fairly distinct tiers, but over time, and possibly due to the addition of the second Wild Card, those tiers are no longer distinct. There’s still a bit of separation though, starting at the top of the last point on the graph. That point belongs to the Royals.

That bright blue line has made some big jumps over the last several years, finishing just above the 93-win mark in the most recent four-year stretch. Cleveland is in second place, nearly three wins behind the Royals. That’s a significant gap.

In other words, the Kansas City Royals have been the most successful team in the league over the last four years, and there really isn’t a logical argument to the contrary.

In the last four years, the Royals are the only AL team with multiple pennants, and while the Red Sox won a title in 2013, they were also terrible the following two years. Other teams may have more playoff appearances, but no team has more playoff wins since 2013, and only the Indians have more regular season wins (352) than the Royals (351).

Even if you extend the timeline to include the 2012 season, the Orioles are the only team who has won more games than the Royals, but they don’t have a shiny trophy like the one in Kauffman Stadium.

Now, this four-year run doesn’t quite measure up to some of the other peaks on that graph, but another chunk of postseason wins would vault them up there, and a World Series title could put them next to the 2003-2007 Red Sox for one of the best five-year stretches of recent memory.

Now let’s check out the NL teams, for funsies.

The first thing I noticed from this graph was just how impressive the Phillies’ run was, as well as how the whole thing collapsed on them. Also the Astros’ line nearly broke the bottom edge of the graph. This one doesn’t quite follow the same pattern as the AL graph, although there is still a bit more clustering since the Wild Card game was instituted.

Beyond that, you can see that only the Cardinals and Dodgers have won more games than the Royals since the start of 2013, and you can count their World Series titles on zero fingers. The Cubs have had a pair of great years preceded by bad years. The Giants would look better if the four-year stretch didn’t include odd-numbered years. And the Nationals haven’t been able to get over the hump in the first round of the playoffs.

You can make a pretty good argument that no National League team has been more successful than the Royals since 2013. If the Cardinals win a title in 2017, perhaps that changes, considering all their other playoff victories, but for now, the Royals are on top.

I’m going to type this again: the Kansas City Royals have been the most successful team in baseball over the last four years.

Think about that for a second. The Royals, who were just wrapping up the worst four-year run in baseball when Dayton Moore took over, have just pulled off the best four-year run in baseball. It’s also one of the best four-year runs of the last decade in the American League. It took a while to get there, but few teams have been able to accomplish what this organization has done in a four-year period. And the bulk of the same core that won all of those games will still be in place for 2017.

Has it taken some luck? Absolutely, they have had their share. You can’t point to a single championship team that didn’t enjoy a bit of good fortune. That’s how baseball works. One great season can happen due to luck. But four years of at least a .500 record, a pair of pennants, and a World Series title? That takes more than luck.

This isn’t meant to be some kind of “rah-rah, the front office is perfect” kind of post. The Royals have made some mistakes along the way, and I don’t think they’ve done enough to bolster their chances in 2017 just yet. Regardless of what happens next year though, what’s happened in the last four years has happened. It can’t be hand-waved away. The Royals have enjoyed more success than anyone recently, and they’ll have one more opportunity to enjoy some more of it.

Super utility players are all the rage these days, and the Royals are in a position to give one such player a full season’s worth of plate appearances. They have a handful of players who will need a day off every week, and they might employ a rotating designated hitter slot, so having a guy capable of moving around would be perfect for the roster. They do have Whit Merrifield currently, but if they are looking for a bit more offense in that role, they might look to the following trio of candidates.

Josh Harrison

There have been some rumblings that the Pirates are willing to listen to trade offers for their Josh-Of-All-Trades. After inking their super utility man to a $27.3 million contract prior to the 2015 season, Harrison’s bat has faded, and the emergence of Jung-ho Kang, along with some promising infielders coming through the system, have made the 29-year-old expendable.

He had a terrific .305 True Average in 2014, but followed it up with a .264 in 2015, and .254 last season. The biggest difference has been in the power department, as his isolated slugging percentage has hovered just above .100 each of the last two years. Some of that may have been caused by a thumb injury that required surgery in July of 2015, so perhaps being farther removed from that could be a big boost to his offensive production.

Harrison is due $18 million over the next two years, with a pair of team options totaling $22 million after that. Were he to bounce back, he’d be incredibly valuable. He’s generally regarded as an above average fielder, particularly on the infield. He spent 2016 between second base and right field, both positions of need for the Royals. He makes a ton of contact and doesn’t draw many walks, which means he’s obligated to play for the Royals at some point. That point could be 2017.

The Pirates would be selling low on Harrison at this point, and if they just want to get out from his salary, it’s possible the prospect cost wouldn’t be as high.

Yangervis Solarte

First and foremost, we have to recognize the excellence of Solarte’s name. The Royals could double their number of players whose first name begins with a “Y,” and any time you have that opportunity, you can’t let it slip away. In addition to the name, Solarte is a pretty darn good baseball player. He burst on the scene with the Yankees in 2014, hitting .346/.414/.521 in his first 140 plate appearances as a big-leaguer. While he stumbled a bit down the stretch, he still ended the year with almost a .270 TAv, a number he approached in 2015 in San Diego.

In 2016, Solarte broke out in a big way, hitting .286/.341/.467, good enough for a .289 TAv. He hit 15 dingers, while only striking out in 14 percent of his plate appearances. The offense was great, but it was improved defensive metrics that led to a 3.3 WARP season for Solarte. He mostly spent time at third base, but a handful of games at second and first resulted in 7.0 Fielding Runs Above Average, far better than his previous high of -2.2 FRAA in 2014.

There is always skepticism that should accompany defensive metrics that swung so wildly in a one-year sample, so take that number with a large hunk of salt. But even if you regress him back to an average rating, his bat is strong enough to provide significant value. Though his primary position is currently occupied by Mike Moustakas, Solarte’s experience at second base (390.2 big-league innings, to be exact) puts him in better position than Cheslor Cuthbert.

He can do damage from both sides of the plate, a trait that is much-needed in the Royals lineup, and is a better option to give Moose some days off, or half-days off, when needed. Solarte is also arbitration-eligible for the first time this year, with MLB Trade Rumors projecting him for a $2.7 million salary. With three years of team control remaining, he’s an excellent fit on the roster. However, that will likely drive up the cost to acquire him from the Padres.

Andres Blanco

It’s time for the prodigal son to come home. Blanco made his major-league debut for the Royals as a baby-faced 20-year-old in 2004. He’s now a bearded veteran, having bounced between Chicago, Texas, and Philadelphia since 2009. You might not remember Blanco’s first Royals tour with much fondness, as he had a .605 OPS in those first three seasons. However, in his last three seasons, Blanco has basically come out of nowhere to post a .795 OPS, including an incredible 2015 campaign in which he hit .292/.360/.502 with 22 doubles in 261 plate appearances.

Here’s a fun, yet totally useless, statistical comparison for 2014-2016:

Player A: .274/.337/.457
Player B: .273/.367/.428

Player A is Blanco. Player B is Ben Zobrist. Fun, right? Granted, Zobrist has accumulated roughly 1,300 more plate appearances in that time frame, and Blanco called Citizens Bank Park home, as well. Useless, but still fun.

Blanco has been a very solid hitter, though, even accounting for the ballpark. He hits line drives with some authority (another fun fact: Blanco’s average exit velocity last year was 89.7 mph, Zobrist was at 89.8) which allows him to maintain a BABIP around .300, if not higher.

Defensively, Blanco played first, second, third, shortstop, and left field over the last three years, though according to FRAA, he was -2.9 runs below average in the most recent season. At 32 years old, it would be no surprise if his fielding ability went downhill, so that could be concerning. However, he could provide something resembling a league average bat at second base, along with the ability to spell everyone else on the infield, and even Alex Gordon in left.

Ideally, Blanco would be a switch-hitting, older Merrifield with a bit more versatility, and more power. And because he’s not likely to command a large financial commitment, he could easily fit into the Royals tight budget.

In all, I think Blanco would be the most affordable option, while still being productive, although the potential of the other two players is quite a bit higher. Any of them would be a welcome addition to the Royals as they try to get back to the playoffs next season.

Because they won back-to-back pennants, it’s normal for teams around the league to adapt some of the Royals’ methods. For instance, bullpen construction looks different now than it did just a couple of years ago. Several teams have gone after multiple elite relief arms, in the same mold of recent Royals squads. They may not have been the first team to have a crazy-good bullpen, but they won with their crazy-good, crazy-deep bullpen, so it became a trend.

With that being said, the Royals did not win the most recent World Series. They didn’t win the most recent American League pennant, or the most recent Central division title, either. For the Royals to climb back on top, perhaps they will need to do some copying now.

First, we’ll look at the Cubs as the model. They just won the World Series in large part because they had an elite defense, a power-hitting third baseman, a young and talented first baseman, and WAIT A MINUTE.

This is in jest, of course. Mike Moustakas is not Kris Bryant, and Eric Hosmer is not Anthony Rizzo. The Royals do not have the positional star power of the Cubs, nor do they have any legitimate aces at the top of the rotation. Both of those things are difficult to acquire in an offseason, and especially in an offseason with the current free agent crop. If the Royals are looking to copy those parts of the Cubs, they’re likely going to be disappointed.

Similarly, it’s going to be tough to pursue the kind of organizational depth the Cubs possessed, though not impossible. The Royals don’t have a Willson Contreras hanging out in the minors, but Hunter Dozier has some potential to make an impact. There are some intriguing arms who may appear in a Carl Edwards, Jr. or Mike Montgomery-type of role out of the bullpen, in Matt Strahm, Andrew Edwards, and Josh Staumont. Jorge Bonifacio doesn’t have Albert Almora’s defensive skills, but his power might provide some punch next summer.

The Royals aren’t going to roll out a lineup like the Cubs. They don’t have four or five great hitters, barring bounce-backs forward from Hosmer, Moose, Alex Gordon, and Lorenzo Cain. But adding an average hitter or two at the second base and/or right field spots could provide some Cubs-like length to the order. It’s still going to take improvement from the farm system to be able to plug in capable bats when needed, but that depth is possibly the most repeatable trait I noticed from the Cubs’ run. Unless the Royals can find their own Jake Arrieta or Kyle Hendricks, of course.

As for the Indians, they had a lot of success down the stretch because their lights-out bullpen did enough to overcome a thin starting rotation and HANG ON NOW.

Okay, okay, the Indians also did really well because they had a bunch of talent in their batting order, along with Corey Kluber as their ace. The real story from Cleveland in the playoffs, though, was the bullpen. More specifically, Terry Francona’s bullpen usage.

He went to Andrew Miller and Cody Allen for multi-inning outings on several occasions, which got them all the way to Game 7. Their front office took the Royals’ bullpen-building strategy and added even more aggressive in-game strategy, and sabermetrically-inclined baseball analysts loved every second of it. Some suggested it was the beginning of a revolution in bullpen management, and that managers would regularly go to their best pitchers in the most important moments, regardless of inning.

The problem, however, is that this strategy almost certainly won’t be used consistently in the regular season.

Don’t get me wrong. I think managers are still too stubborn in how they deploy their relievers, and there are some situations where they could be less conservative, particularly in tie games on the road. The issue, though, is that the playoffs are essentially a completely different game. There are fewer off days in the regular season, so managers can’t go all out to win a single game, because there are consequences in the next game, and the game after that.

There’s also the issue of how pitchers would react to being deployed in different innings, particularly with short notice. Many relievers are creatures of habit, and disrupting or cutting their routines short could potentially limit their effectiveness, and perhaps even lead to more stress or injuries. Managers don’t like to have relievers warm up without coming in the game, and this aggressive strategy could create exponentially more of those decisions.

This says nothing of the compensation impact for relief pitchers, either. Until the arbitration process stops focusing on saves above other statistical measures, relievers will want to make sure they’re in the best position to get paid, and that conflict can put managers in tricky situations. It’s simply not a strategy that is likely going to be repeated until next October. Sorry for that unnecessarily long rabbit trail. Anyway.

I do think Ned Yost could learn a thing or two from Tito when it comes to lineup construction (think of Gordon in a leadoff role like Carlos Santana), and perhaps a bit more aggression in his bullpen management could pay off, but the Royals are already fairly well-constructed to copy the Indians. They’ll need some guys to take large steps forward, a la Jose Ramirez and Tyler Naquin, and it would sure help to have the bounce-backs I mentioned earlier, but they don’t have to make any organization-impacting moves this winter.

History is written by the victors, and surely we’ll see articles about how the Cubs (or Indians) have the new secret recipe for success. The Cubs tanked for a few years, acquired a bunch of super-talented players, and spent a large chunk of money on an ace. The Indians made some shrewd moves without totally rebuilding, and got quite a bit of production from unexpected sources. Neither of those are guaranteed strategies for winning, but the Royals can look at the peripheral strategies to return to the playoffs. With more depth and some altered tactical approaches, they can provide some much-needed support to their core next year.

If there’s one thing keeping some folks off of the Duffy bandwagon, though, it’s probably his finish to the season. After putting up a 2.61 ERA through his first 19 starts, Duffy’s last seven starts (beginning with a seven-run, five-inning performance on August 27) resulted in a 6.37 ERA. He was still missing bats and mostly limiting walks, but the contact he did allow tended to result in runs. He surrendered 12 dingers in those 41 innings, compared to 14 allowed in his first 120.2 innings as a starter.

Opposing batters were really teeing off on his hard stuff, as they hit .328 with a .731 slugging percentage against his four-seamer and .450 with an .800 slugging percentage against his sinker from August 27 through the end of the season. His sinker was never a great pitch for him, but compare the fastball results to a .195/.305 line allowed prior to then, and you can immediately see from where those runs came.

Prior to this season, Duffy’s career high in innings was around 150 innings, so it’s fair to wonder if the extra work took its toll on his left arm. Looking at his velocity chart throughout the season, there certainly were signs of fatigue, in the form of a decline, though maybe not as severe as you might expect. If you only focus on his work as a starter who wasn’t restricted with a pitch count (doing otherwise would be pretty foolish), Duffy saw a velocity drop of less than a mile per hour. That’s not nothing, but even after August 27 he was still averaging better than 94.5 mph with his fastballs. Less velocity didn’t help him. I also don’t think that was the sole issue.

Both of his fastballs still had plenty of movement, and the spin rates for both his four-seam and two-seam fastballs were pretty similar between the two periods. His release points were nearly identical as well, so that doesn’t appear to be a factor.

No, the biggest driving force for Duffy, as it is with just about every pitcher, was his location. I’m going to show you a moving picture now, displaying Duffy’s fastball locations from each set of starts.

There are a couple of things that immediately jump out. First, you see a shift of the concentration of pitches, from up in the zone to down. You’ll hear a lot of commentators talk about pitchers wanting to keep the ball down, but a pitcher like Duffy doesn’t really want to live down in the zone. His fastball is most effective at the top of the zone and just above it, where he can induce popups and medium-depth fly balls. With so many players in today’s game having swings tailored to attack the lower third, Duffy needs to elevate his heater to exploit their weaknesses. As the season wore on, Duffy was not able to spot his fastball up quite as well. As a result, batters crushed the pitches in their nitro zone.

The second thing you’ll notice is the super bright red square right in the middle of the strike zone. That’s another spot where batters like to see pitches. The bright redness is a bad thing for a pitcher. Too often in those last few starts, Duffy grooved a pitch and paid the price. As a matter of fact, when an at-bat ended on a middle-middle fastball during that time, opponents slugged 1.563.

If there’s a silver lining here, it’s that this is a correctable problem. This isn’t Duffy losing his control. This isn’t the league learning to hit him when he’s on. This is a pitcher who threw more pitches than he ever had before, who was ever-so-slightly off with his command. His other numbers are still impressive, and still suggest he’s capable of shoving on a regular basis. He likely needs just a bit of rest, and a bit of time to build up his stamina over the winter. It’s not a guarantee, but a full offseason should return Duffy to his maximum level of gnarness.